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Abstract
From late 2019 to the first half of 2020, the world has witnessed the epic spread and destruction of the novel coronavirus which was
discovered in Wuhan, China. The huge number of infections and deaths caused by the virus, the collapse of the healthcare system
and the economic consequences have few modern equivalents. While governments of all countries are responding to the pandemic,
a heated debate rages about which political system, democracy versus authoritarian, is better positioned to respond to the pandemic.
While the worldwide effort to contain the virus continues, we offer a preliminary comparison between democracies and authoritarian
regimes in their responses to COVID-19, and policy suggestions for democracies to improve their governance and their ability to
respond to crises.
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Introduction
In December 2019, people in Wuhan, a major city of 11
million people in central China, were found to be infected
by a new coronavirus that may cause severe acute
respiratory disease. At first, the Chinese government kept
the virus secret from the world until it rapidly spread in
Wuhan causing tens of thousands of people to become sick,
many of whom died. On 23 January 2020, at 2:00 am, the
Chinese government announced that they were closing the
city at 10:00 am. Fearing being locked in the city, an
estimated five million Wuhan residents fled (First Caijing,
2020). Many of them were infected, hence beginning the
great spread of the virus worldwide.
By April 2020, the virus, which is named COVID-19,
rapidly spread in the world. While the final body count is
still growing, at the writing of this article (22 April 2020),
already over 2.6 million were infected and more than
180,000 died. In merely three months, the world has
witnessed the collapse of healthcare systems. The economic
consequences that have followed have few modern
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parallels, and governments of all nations are facing a
mounting, grave challenge that is unprecedented.
The crisis has put the governments of all infected
nations in a spotlight in terms of how they responded. At
first, most people in the world, especially in the
democracies, put the blame on the authoritarian government
of China for suppressing the information on the outbreak.
By mid-March, the Chinese government declared that its
military-style measures of closing cities had stopped the
spread, and opinions in the democracies began to change.
A commentary in Bloomberg suggested that the Chinese
model of containment is superior to the democratic one
(Brands, 2020). Another article at CNN mused on how
Russia, with a population of 146 million, has fewer
coronavirus cases than Luxembourg (Ilyushina, 2020). Yet
another CNN article praised the ‘success of China’s
sweeping, top-down efforts to control the virus’ (Westcott,
2020). A National Review article concludes that ‘for the
time being, China seems to be ahead in the geopolitical
game’ (Maçães, 2020).
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This change of opinions raises an urgent and
important question on the regime type and responses to
COVID-19 (Alon & Li, 2020), and a more general,
fundamental question on how we should respond to the
criticism of, or dissatisfaction toward, democracy
within the democracies, and their citizens’ preferences
for a more authoritarian government for its perceived
decisiveness and efficiency?
In this perspective essay, we will examine the responses
to COVID-19 by the two major opposing types of political
systems: democracy versus authoritarianism. We will
present the cases of responses by China, the WHO and by
some democracies.
We will use the qualitative method to build our arguments.
Specifically, we adopt a multi-case qualitative approach
following Eisenhardt (1989). This enables us to follow a
replication approach wherein the insights from each case can
confirm or refute inferences from the others. We further use
Mill’s Similar System Design in order to directly compare
China to Taiwan (Mill, 1843). A comparison of China’s
response to Taiwan’s provides us with this ‘most similar
research design’ popular with comparative political scientists
(e.g., Teune & Przeworski, 1970). The two governments
have ruled separately since 1949 but share a common history,
culture and language. Differences in responses can be
attributed to differences in governance. Furthermore, we use
anecdotal evidence, reports, statistics, and government
documents and policies to support our arguments. We also
use scholarly sources to bolster our view.

COVID-19 and Crisis Management
By most definitions, crises are temporally limited events
that, while important, do not constitute the bulk of our
existence. Crisis in business is a disruption or problem that
triggers negative reaction and impacts financial wellbeing
(Kádárová, 2010). The Chinese phrase for crisis, wéijī (危
机), consists of two ideographs: danger and opportunity.
The current COVID-19 crisis presents us with both and
gives us an opportunity to examine the differences in policy
responses between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
The COVID-19 crisis is, at the time of this writing,
relatively new and an ongoing situation. As such, scholarly
publications regarding the nation-level response to the
pandemic are few. Nonetheless, some researchers have
established recommendations for dealing with the novel
coronavirus at the governmental level. For instance,
several have emphasized the need for cooperation. In
Africa, the early formation of the AFTCOR taskforce
helped to spread testing capabilities. Prior to the
establishment of the taskforce, only 2 countries in the
entire continent were capable of testing for COVID-19;
afterwards, and as a result of its actions, 40 countries were
able to contribute to testing efforts (Nkengasong &
Mankoula, 2020). This need for cooperation exists not
only at the national but also subnational level. For

example, physicians in the USA have emphasized the need
for cooperation among states. States are bidding against
one another for supplies, which does not necessarily send
the supplies to the states which need them but to those
which can afford them. This inefficiency may exacerbate
the spread of the disease in the long term (Ranney et al.,
2020). In addition to echoing the call for international
cooperation, Phelan et al. (2020) note that mandatory
lockdowns are somewhat authoritarian in nature: They
have the potential to erode public trust and may also
violate human rights such as freedom of movement.
In examining national responses to the novel coronavirus,
other researchers have noted historical parallels with past
epidemics. While some of the negative elements, such as a
slow initial response, are typical of how epidemics have
been dealt with historically on a national level, other items
are more promising, such as the success of quarantines in
mitigating disease spread and mortality (Jones, 2020).

Theoretical Conceptualization and
Considerations: Crises and Regime
Type
Following Linz (1964), we refer to governments as
‘authoritarian’ when (a) they offer no or very limited
political pluralism, (b) obtain legitimacy through appeals
to emotion and present the regime as a solution to easilyidentified societal problems, (c) suppress anti-regime
sentiment and/or activities and (d) have broadly-defined
powers that can be changed at will. Democracy, similarly,
has four key elements: (a) the voters are represented by
officials chosen through free and fair elections, (b) citizens
are permitted to participate in the political system, (c)
human rights of the citizens are protected and (d) the rule
of law is enforced and laws apply equally to all citizens
(Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Although this definition is
closer to that of a republic than a ‘pure’Athenian democracy,
it is suitable for a discussion in terms of the Manichean
authoritarian/democratic dichotomy.
In democracies, policies reflect inputs and balances of
different constituencies; mistakes can be corrected through
elections and public debates; information is freely flowing
and, due to transparency and competition on the media
market, the quality of public information is higher.
However, their pluralistic nature tends to make their policy
process slow (Li, 2009).
In authoritarian regimes, policy process is opaque and
mainly reflects the ruling class’s views. There are no
formal channels to effectively correct mistakes. Due to the
lack of free flow of information and lack of media
competition, public information is of low quality and
untrustworthy, and people rely on private messages and
rumours for information. Due to the lack of checks and
balances and the lack of public debates, policy process can
be fast (Li, 2009).
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Political science research suggests several avenues in
which democratic systems may be overarchingly preferable
to others. For example, democracies, in general, tend to
have fewer civil wars, fewer wars with each other and
fewer wars overall (Hegre, 2001; Ray, 2003). Democratic
regimes are also less likely to kill their own citizens (i.e.,
democide; Rummel, 1997). Political institutions found in
democracies are more likely to positively influence the
prevalence of corruption, such as freedom of the press or
parliamentary systems (Lederman et al., 2005).
Democracies also suffer fewer terrorist attacks and fewer
casualties in those attacks, possibly due to greater concern
over citizen safety and wellbeing (Magen, 2018).
Obviously, framing the debate as being one between
authoritarianism and democracy neglects alternative causal
explanations and abandons nuance regarding classification
of systems in favour of a binary oversimplification of
reality. While type of government certainly influences
policy which in turn affects crisis response, other factors,
such as cultural frequency of gatherings, could play a
significant role (Maçães, 2020). For example, incorporating
Hofstedian cultural dimensions into our discussion might
also help us understand the responses of different countries
to a crisis such as the new coronavirus outbreak versus
solely examining purely political factors. Specifically, the
contrast between individualism and collectivism can
provide insights in this regard, since collectivist societies

should cooperate more for the greater good, as we discuss
later (Hofstede, 2015).

Comparative Cases
China’s Response
In 2002 and 2003, China had its first outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) caused by a coronavirus
in Guangdong Province in the south. This is believed to
have originated in bats and spread to humans via civets
(Quanlin, 2006).
After the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government
spent about $100 million to set up ‘the largest system in
the world’ for a ‘direct-reporting network for infectious
diseases and sudden public health events’. It was promised
that using the system, any doctor at the lowest level would
be able to directly report signs of the disease outbreak to
the central government in real time (Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2019; Cidiwuyan, 2020).
In 2015, Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan Institute
of Virology, co-authored an article that warned of viruses
similar to that responsible for the SARS circulating among
the Chinese bat population that may pose a serious future
threat (Nandi, 2020).
For the remainder of this section, we discuss that threat
and how events have unfolded. See Table 1 for a brief
timeline of the early stages of the crisis.

Table 1. Timeline of Major Events: Early COVID-19 Crisis
Dates (All Dates
2020)
31 December
6 January
11 January
14 January

17 January
21 January
23 January
27 January
28 January
29 January
31 January

Event
The CCP begins censoring relevant terms from
social media.
The CDC issues a travel advisory for Wuhan
province.
The CDC tweets about a pneumonia outbreak in
China related to coronavirus.
The WHO tweets that there is no evidence of
widespread human-to-human transmission of the
novel coronavirus.
The CDC begins screening travellers from China.
The first case is reported in the USA from someone
who travelled directly from Wuhan.
Chinese authorities lock down Wuhan.
The WHO raises the alert level while still claiming
that China has the virus contained.
The CDC states that risk in the USA is considered
low.
The White House announces the creation of the
Coronavirus Task Force.
President Trump bans all travel from China.

Notes
A day later, authorities force Dr Li Wenliang to write a
self-criticism.

The tweet cites a preliminary investigation by Chinese
authorities.
These screenings are limited to a mere 3 airports.

This comes a mere 20 days after scientific research on
the virus is banned and samples are ordered destroyed.

On the same day, the WHO continued to downplay the
threat of the novel coronavirus.
On the same day, China criticized the USA for the
travel warning as ‘mean’ (Reuters, 2020).
On 3 February, the WHO urged countries not to close
borders to foreigners from China (Schlein, 2020).
(Table 1 Continued)
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(Table 1 Continued)

Dates (All Dates
2020)
12 February
21 February
29 February

Event
Notes
The CDC continues to wait for Chinese approval to
send a team to the country.
The CDC tweets that it is working with states to
prepare. Italy announces its first case.
The first death from the virus is reported in the
USA.

Source: Compiled by authors.

In December 2019, people in Wuhan were found to be
infected by a new coronavirus that may cause severe acute
respiratory disease. Some of the early patients visited the
Huanan Wild Animal and Seafood Market. Doctors in
Wuhan warned their family and friends about the disease
but they were reprimanded and even arrested. The bestknown doctor among them is the late Dr Li Wenliang, who
was arrested for warning others and later died of the virus.
Some official doctors tried to report it to the central
government but were warned by their supervisors to be
‘cautious in reporting’. Fearing being punished, they did
not report. Evidence shows that the central government
learned of it in early January but it decided to keep the
information from the public.
By mid-January, the virus had rapidly spread in
Wuhan. On 23 January 2020, 2:00 am, the Chinese
government announced the closure of the city at 10:00
am. Fearing being locked in the city, an estimated five
million Wuhan residents fled (First Caijing, 2020). Many
were infected, hence beginning the great spread of the
virus worldwide. Soon after, virtually all cities and
villages in China were closed.
In February 2020, some reported that Remdesivir, a
drug developed by the US company Gilead Sciences, might
be effective in fighting the virus. Soon after these reports,
the Wuhan Institute of Virology applied for the patent on
the use of Remdesivir in China. This act was criticized as
unethically profiting from the outbreak (Ye, 2020).
On 27 February, Zhong Nanshan, the prominent Chinese
infectious disease expert with the highest political position
in the Chinese government, questioned the common
knowledge that the virus originated in Wuhan: ‘The
infection was first spotted in China but the virus may not
have originated in China’. Soon after, a senior Chinese
official, Zhao Lijian, claimed on Twitter (which is banned
by the Chinese government in China): ‘It might be the US
army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan’ (Westcoot &
Jiang, 2020).
According to a The New York Times report, ‘Russia and
China, as well as Iran, have sharply increased their
dissemination of disinformation about the coronavirus
since January, even repeating and amplifying one another’s
propaganda and falsehoods, including anti-American
conspiracy theories’ (Barnes et al., 2020).

Around mid-March, the Chinese government began to
claim that Wuhan had achieved ‘zero cases’. However,
information leaked from China shows that that may not be
true (Bloomberg, 2020b). One report—which has been
repeatedly deleted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and reposted by others—described a patient being rejected
by several hospitals in Wuhan so the CCP could maintain
their ‘zero cases’ records due to pressure from the higherups for propaganda purposes (New Tang Dynasty
Television, 2020). Beijing and Shanghai, along with some
other regions, bar Wuhan, Hubei people who are officially
cleared of the virus, indicating that the authorities of other
regions do not believe the ‘zero cases’ claim by Wuhan,
Hubei (Radio France Internationale, 2020).
In late March, the Chinese government finally allowed
families to retrieve the ashes of their loved ones who died
during the outbreak in Wuhan under tight security. The
families must be accompanied by local officials to retrieve
the ashes, and they were not allowed to cry or show any
grief. According to the official report, the total deaths due
to the virus in Wuhan is 2,535 (which was later adjusted to
3,869 by the Chinese government; Page & Fan, 2020). But
based on the large number of urns distributed to the official
cremation service stations, which, by one estimate, is
64,000, the death toll due to the virus is much higher.
Assuming normal deaths during the period to be 5,000,
then the actual number of coronavirus-related deaths is
59,000 in Wuhan. Projecting to the whole country, the
actual numbers of confirmed cases and deaths in China
should be 1.2 million and 97,000, respectively (Bloomberg,
2020a; Caijing Lengyan, 2020).
Aside from the evidence that the number of cases and
deaths may be underreported, the definition of confirmed
cases China uses is different: China only counts people
with symptoms, whereas the rest of the world count people
who tested positive regardless of whether they show
symptoms. Logically, the number from China is lower
because many infected people do not show symptoms.

Taiwan’s Reaction
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan showcase efficient
democratic responses to the crisis. Italy and the USA were
slow initially but caught up quickly through travel
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restrictions, quarantines and social distancing measures.
Taiwan’s reaction was exemplary and can be used to
contrast with China’s as they share many of the same
characteristics such as culture and ethnicity, with the key
difference being that Taiwan has vibrant democratic
institutions. The island is only 81 miles away and shares a
common history with the mainland. Taiwan was well
positioned to handle the crisis as it has had experiences
with misinformation from China as well as previous
exposure to SARS which allowed them to build a national
early warning system. Although we are not the first to use
these factors to compare China to Taiwan (e.g., Li, 1989);
to our knowledge, this method has not been used in the
context of the present pandemic.
On 31 December, Chinese officials notified the WHO of
several cases of pneumonia, alerting Taiwan Centers for
Disease Control to monitor passengers arriving from
Wuhan. Suspected cases were immediately screened for 26
different viruses. By mid-January, Taiwan sent a team of
experts to China, prompting the rapid establishment of a
Central Epidemic Command Center and stopping all flights
from Wuhan by 26 January. Simultaneously, the
government distributed 6.5 million masks, 84,000 litres of
hand sanitizer and 25,000 forehead thermometers.
Combining surveillance technology in airports, big data,
health data and tracing technology, the government took
fast action to stymie the spread (Scher, 2020). Transparent
and open communications, a feature of democratic
countries, allowed Taiwan’s response to be more effective
and less invasive than China’s.
This openness has not only benefitted Taiwan but also
the rest of the world. Taiwan has freely shared its
experiences and advice for fighting the pandemic. In
contrast, China continues to obfuscate and distort available
information. For example, the CCP has recently ordered
that all research into the origins of the virus must be
approved by the party (Gan et al., 2020), hampering future
efforts towards preventing the spread of a similar epidemic.
Taiwan has also been successful in rapidly implementing
strict control measures—which are supposedly one of the
advantages of authoritarianism. Taiwan has successfully
rationed masks while repurposing private production in
order to more than quadruple the amount available. As we
have previously noted, Taiwan’s government was rapid in
implementing a travel ban from China and Hong Kong,
and also monitors its citizens to ensure the effectiveness of
quarantine efforts. Simultaneously, and unlike authoritarian
regimes, Taiwan quickly produced a welfare programme
for affected citizens, incentivizing them to honestly report
symptoms and enabling them to live at home without fear
of starvation (Yang, 2020).
As a result of their reaction, Taiwan government did not
suffer a loss of legitimacy, protected its citizenry and has
earned a special place as ‘a nation-state’ among observers
of the disease. Its subjugation in international organizations

FIIB Business Review 9(3)
should be reexamined because it is a risk to not only its
own statehood but also the health of the global political
economy—and, quite literally, the health of the globe.
Although it has been excluded from the WHO due to
pressure from China, Taiwan has been more effective in
limiting the virus’ spread (Yang, 2020).

The WHO’s Response
The head of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, is
from Ethiopia, a country that took large amount of financial
aid and investment from China. He and the WHO played
along with the CCP to mislead the world. China’s increased
involvement in Ethiopia is part of an assertive diplomatic
and economic relationship building in Africa, including the
exchange of infrastructural improvements for natural
resources and political support (Adem, 2012). Africa is an
integral part of China’s expansionism through the Belt and
Road Initiative (Zhang et al., 2018). China endorsed
Ghebreyesus to head the WHO and the relationship
between these two organizations is now under a microscope.
The first fatal error made by the WHO was by tweeting
on 14 January 2020 that ‘preliminary investigations
conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear
evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel
coronavirus’ assuring the world that a rapid and radical
response to contain the virus was unnecessary. This was at
a time when the Chinese government already knew the
disease was spreading. Why did the WHO not conduct its
own due diligence? Was the WHO fulfilling its mission?
The second gigantic error by the WHO was their
dismissive attitude towards Taiwan, who forewarned the
WHO of the novel coronavirus at the end of December
2019. Taipei reported that they had isolated the infected
patients for treatment, implying human-to-human
transmission of the virus, to the International Health
Regulations (IHR), an organization under the WHO with a
task of preventing epidemics from spreading. This warning
was not shared with other countries (Manson, 2020).
Taiwan is not an official member country in the WHO
because China forbids it from being recognized as a separate
nation-state. The WHO chose to ignore this warning in
favour of official reports from the Chinese government
stating that the virus was not transmissible interpersonally.
The third fatal error that the WHO has made is that it did
not declare COVID-19 as a pandemic until 11 March 2020,
well after it was generally already recognized as having all
the traits of a pandemic. The delayed announcement by the
WHO has delayed appropriate government responses to
the global crisis and has accounted for numerous lives lost.
A big question mark rises over the WHO’s relationship
with China as well as its effectiveness as an international
organization.
The failure of the WHO will be investigated in detail in
the months and years ahead. Particularly vexing is the
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WHOʼs links to the CCP and how the latter influenced it
through reciprocal relations, exchanges of favours and
financial commitments.

Discussion
The Political System and Response
Effectiveness
Why did China’s alerting system fail? Why were the
doctors who alerted others punished by the Chinese
government? To answer these questions, we need to look
more closely at how the CCP was founded and how it is
run. The CCP is founded on communists’ conviction that
they are the only ones who know the destiny of humankind,
and they have the mission to lead humankind to reach that
destiny—communism. Unlike democracy, in which
officials are elected by voters, the legitimacy of communists’
rule comes from the use of violent force and its insistence
on its own infallibility, which requires it to censor all
criticism and deprives people of their voting power (Li &
Alon, 2020). The central government appoints the heads of
provinces, who in turn appoint the heads of cities. In such
a system, officials of every level answer only to the officials
of upper levels. They all serve the most important goal of
the party: keeping it in absolute power. To get promoted,
officials must keep their superior happy, only tell the boss
good news and suppress anything, decisively, that may
cause instability, such as disease outbreaks.
In a democracy, locally elected officials are responsible
to the people who elected them or else they lose their jobs.
Thus, if there is a new, fast-spreading disease, they must
quickly react to protect their constituencies by letting the
world know so that their people and region can get help.
While democracies are not immune to complacency or
incompetence, they do have one feature that authoritarians
do not: accountability to the people.
The relative success of Taiwan, Korea and Japan shows
that the accountability to the people in democracies is key,
democracies are not intrinsically inferior to authoritarians
in crisis response and that it does not require a dictatorship
to be efficient and effective.

Other Factors That May Explain
Differences in Response
As we mentioned earlier, focusing the debate on regime
type as the main explanation of crisis response must also
consider other factors such as culture (Maçães, 2020). In
this respect, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede,
2015), especially the individualism versus collectivism
dimension, may offer a powerful explanation on the
differences in effectiveness of response between Asian
countries, which emphasize collectivism, and Western
countries, which champion individualism. It has been
observed that East Asian countries tend to respond to the

outbreak more effectively than the West, regardless of their
different political systems. This implies that culture may be
a powerful explanation factor for the effectiveness of
response by different nations. While culture is not our
focus, it needs to be further studied.
Further, existing political structures might be adapted to
service the conditions brought about by the virus. In the
same way that democratic regimes sometimes have
authoritarian features (and vice versa), measures deemed
politically undesirable in the long term but urgently needed
in the short run might be undertaken. For example, the
USA has sought to deal with the crisis by temporarily
granting indefinite detention powers to the Department of
Justice. Although this would constitute a democratic
country taking an arguably authoritarian course of action,
the realities of combating COVID-19 might mean that
idealism will take a backseat to pragmatic actions in the
short run (Swan, 2020).
The evidence we have presented indicates that
authoritarianism is not a prerequisite in dealing with the
coronavirus or other crises. The token efforts of authoritarian
regimes to peddle influence through donations of supplies
do not counteract their negative impact on the world,
including calling into question the WHO’s objectivity and
ability to prepare member states for the crisis.

Policy Implications: What Can Democracies
Improve?
Nevertheless, if being a democracy were a cure-all, there
would have been no bungled responses in democratic
states. It is a favourite tactic of CCP apologists to cite tu
quoque red herrings in an effort to deflect criticism
(Economist, 2020), which would seem to be an odd strategy
for a regime which views its own actions as defensible.
However illogical the technique, their points might be
somewhat valid in the case of the coronavirus crisis, as
democracies have not been unimpeachable in their
response. We offer suggestions below as to how
democracies as a whole might improve their responses to
crises moving forward.
The first phenomenon that needs to be rethought is
directly related to the efficiency of the response.
Undoubtedly, from an economic point of view, efficiency
and equality (or individual rights) are inherently
contradictions. Governments in democratic countries must
engage within the scope of law and cannot rely on
unrestricted powers as in authoritarian countries, which
routinely infringe upon individual rights and pursue a
single goal that the government deems important regardless
of social costs. This institutional constraint of democracies
has caused many inconveniences in rapidly responding to
disasters. However, this inconvenience should not be used
as an excuse for sluggish action because in response to
disasters such as wars and plagues, the governments of
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democratic countries should have the power to declare a
state of emergency and even expropriate social and civilian
assets for quick responses.
Of course, when a democratic country requisitions
civilian resources and restricts citizens’ rights, the
government needs to have a reasonable explanation for
society, and it should also compensate affected citizens
afterwards according to law. It is relatively easy to
implement a state of emergency in a state of war because
the enemy’s aggression against the country is the best
explanation and reason for mobilization of the people. But
it is much more difficult for politicians to persuade citizens
to respond quickly to the beginning of an infectious disease
because it is often difficult to see the serious consequences
of an outbreak. Regardless of calculations based on
ignorance, short-sightedness and personal interests, the
slow and even wrong decisions of the general public,
especially politicians, will bring disaster to the entire
society. The slow response of politicians in Italy, Spain, the
United States and other countries to the epidemic has
already brought heavy costs to the country and the world.1
How to reduce partisan gridlock when dealing with largescale social disasters in the policy process is a topic that
democratic societies should examine.
Second, this crisis shows the vulnerability of the open
society in democracies to an expansive authoritarian power
in the world. We need to rethink how to protect our ways of
life from dictatorships such as China, as our societies,
especially our borders, are open to them. In this sense,
democracies should learn a deeper lesson from this disaster,
that is, national borders cannot limit the calamities that
totalitarian systems bring to humankind. We must realize
that the pursuit of power by an authoritarian regime is not
bounded by its national border, not only in terms of their
military and economic expansion but also in terms of their
domestic disasters, which, as we have seen in the pandemic,
can easily transcend national boundaries. A consensus that is
being formed in this crisis is that the CCP’s stifling of
freedom of the press, and concealment of the epidemic, are
the initial cause of the spread of the new coronavirus
epidemic. The outbreak clearly reminds every democracy in
the world that trying to coexist peacefully with dictatorships
and ignoring their violations of civil rights is extremely
short-sighted. The democracies must realize that supporting
the people in dictatorships for their quest for human rights
and the rule of law is not merely a charitable action but the
first line of defence for the democracies themselves.
Third, unlike the several international financial and
economic crises in the past, humankind is currently facing
triple crises: First, it is a humanitarian crisis and people are
greatly afraid of the uncertainty of the spread of the
epidemic. In democracies, politicians are also naturally
distrusted by voters in responding to the crisis. This
increases the difficulty of implementing any policies.
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Second, this is also a financial and economic crisis. Unlike
before, this time the crisis is simultaneous in both supply
and demand. These factors hamper the effectiveness of
existing monetary and fiscal policy instruments and will
also increase the long-term side effects of these policies.
Finally, the crisis is also a showdown of the two
fundamentally different political and economic systems.
The authoritarian system hopes to use this crisis to further
weaken the democratic system. On the one hand, the
Chinese government is trying to cover up its mistakes, and
on the other hand, it falsely publicizes its so-called
institutional advantages. Ultimately, the triple crises lead to
the most challenging crisis of all: The lack of world
leadership among the democracies to formulate and
execute concerted efforts to deal with the crises unseen.

Concluding Remarks
The COVID-19 crisis is a truly pivotal moment in modern
history. The economic and health consequences are far
reaching but it also represents a possible shift in the world
order that will potentially be in favour of authoritarianism
(Maçães, 2020). While facing the danger that democracies
might lose out in the battle for hearts and minds worldwide,
the opportunity exists for democratic countries to embrace
this challenge and move the world away from authoritarian
systems, who, as we have shown, are not by systemic
design better-suited for this crisis. In fact, their upward
accountability systems may mean that crises are allowed to
balloon to an unmanageable size before the ruling entity is
forced to admit to and address them. As we see in the
pandemic, the decisiveness of the dictatorship in
implementing a coverup has turned a local infectious
disease into a global pandemic and then their equally rapid
effort to lock down the entire nation has resulted in huge
sacrifices and economic costs.
Thus, for the democracies, the pandemic provides a
window for us to fight back, an opportunity for us to
recognize the shortcomings of our institutions, an
opportunity to face up to our internal problems and improve
governance and state capacities; it is also an opportunity to
recognize the true nature of the authoritarian system, and
therefore an opportunity to deal with it with a long-term
goal in mind: protecting the democratic system and our
way of life worldwide.
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Note
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